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Beyond Disparate Impact: How the Fair Housing
Movement Can Move On
Rigel C. Oliveri*
I. INTRODUCTION

Disparate impact theory is a vital tool for fair housing advocates. It
allows them to challenge institutional behaviors that harm minority groups
and municipal practices that perpetuate long-standing segregated patterns,
without having to go through the often impossible process of identifying a
specific bad actor with explicitly discriminatory motives.
Disparate impact theory has been a failure for fair housing advocates. It
is overly complicated, infrequently used, and seldom leads to plaintiff
success.
Moreover, the availability of this theory has led to the
underdevelopment of the law surrounding intentional discrimination, which
has ultimately made all fair housing cases with circumstantial evidence more
difficult to prove.
According to respected commentators, both of the above paragraphs are
true: it has been both an important mechanism for addressing housing
discrimination and an underutilized, counterproductive disappointment.
Suffice it to say, the disparate impact cause of action has been one of the most
theoretically significant, misunderstood, and controversial doctrines to arise in
the area of antidiscrimination law.
There is now a greater urgency to this debate, because whatever else
disparate impact theory may be in the context of fair housing, it is clearly in
danger. After decades of near-unanimous recognition of the theory by the
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently heard a
case in which the sole issue presented is whether disparate impact theory is
cognizable under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA").I Between a conservative
majority on the Court and a handful of recent opinions that undermine other
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri. B.A. University of Virginia, J.D. Stanford
Law School. The author was formerly a Trial Attorney for the United States Department of Justice's Civil
Rights Division, in the Housing & Civil Enforcement Section. I am grateful for comments and suggestions
from Tim Iglesias, and for the ability to present this paper at the Washburn University School of Law
Symposium on The Future of Housing: Equity, Stability, and Sustainability.
1. The case, Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities, Inc., is

actually the third time that the issue has been before the court in as many years. See 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014).
The Court granted certiorari in two earlier cases. See Twp. of Mt. Holly, New Jersey v. Mt. Holly Gardens
Citizens in Action, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013); Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011); infra Part ll(B)(l)(2). Both cases settled after briefing but before oral argument. Many people believe these settlements were
achieved in large part because fair housing advocates were hoping to prevent the issue from coming before
the Court.
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aspects of antidiscrimination law which had been previously viewed as sound,
the Supreme Court may well pose an existential threat to the theory of
disparate impact in housing cases.
This has provoked distress in the fair housing community-even among
those who have pointed out the doctrine's flaws. With a social ill as pervasive
and intractable as housing discrimination, fair housing advocates want every
tool-even a flawed one-at their disposal. Moreover, despite problems in
practice, disparate impact theory has a conceptual significance that cannot be
denied.
By decoupling strict concepts of intent from actionable
discrimination, disparate impact theory permits a more expansive challenge to
policies and decisions that can be seen as constituting societal discrimination.
Through this Article, I seek neither to praise disparate impact theory nor
to bury it. Rather, I endeavor to make use of this particular legal moment to
examine the doctrine and its application to fair housing cases. I begin with
the assumption that disparate impact theory in housing is destined either for
extinction or to continue in its current underperforming state. In light of these
two, unsatisfactory outcomes, we must ask: What benefits does disparate
impact really add? If it is not achieving its hoped-for results, how can it be
improved? If it is to be eliminated, how can advocates achieve these benefits
through other means? Put another way: How can fair housing advocates
move beyond disparate impact, at least as it currently exists?
II. DISPARATE IMPACT BACKGROUND

A. Background and History
Disparate impact theory allows a discrimination claim to be cognizable
even in the absence of evidence of an intentionally discriminatory act.
Instead, the fact that a facially-neutral act, policy, or practice has a
disproportionate adverse impact on a group of people with an identified,
protected characteristic can be enough to allow a plaintiff to state a claim for
2
discrimination.
Disparate impact theory was first articulated in a Title VII case, Griggs
v. Duke Power Co. 3 In that case, the Court was considering a challenge to a
power company's policies for the hire and transfer of employees.
Specifically, the company instituted a policy requiring a high-school diploma
and/or a passing score on two tests-an IQ test and the Wonderlic Personnel
Test. These requirements did not measure the ability to do the particular jobs
in question-which involved manual labor-and had the effect of excluding a

2. The defendant is then permitted to raise the defense that the act, policy, or practice serves a
substantial, legitimate, and nondiscriminatory interest, which will be discussed in Part Ill(A), infra.
3. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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4
disproportionately high number of blacks from hire and promotion.
The defendant had argued that the requirements were neutral, there was
no showing of discriminatory purpose or invidious intent in their adoption,
and that they would be applied equally to whites and blacks alike. Thus, the
lower courts held that the plaintiffs could not state a claim for discrimination.
The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that Title VII "proscribes not only
overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory
in operation." 5 The Court went on to note that the key to evaluating such
practices is whether they can be justified by business necessity: "If an
employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to
be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." 6 Thus, the earliest
Title VII disparate impact cases set forth an affirmative defense of business
necessity.
A series of cases later followed in which lower federal courts allowed
disparate impact theory to apply to Equal Protection claims. 7 Adopting the
language of strict scrutiny, these cases defined the defense burden as one of
demonstrating a compelling government interest.
The first case to recognize the theory in a claim brought under the FHA
was United States v. City of Black Jack, Missouri.8 At issue was the newlyformed City of Black Jack's zoning ordinance, which would have prohibited
all multifamily housing within the city limits. Finding that the plaintiff could
state a claim based on the exclusionary effect that the zoning ordinance would
have on potential black residents, the court held:

The plaintiff need make no showing whatsoever that the action resulting in
racial discrimination in housing was racially motivated.... Effect, and not
motivation, is the touchstone, in part because clever men may easily conceal
their motivations, but more importantly, because whatever our law was once,
we now firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as
disastrous and unfair
to private rights and the public interest as the perversity of
9
a willful scheme.

In doing so, the court cited almost exclusively to the Equal Protection
cases and conducted its analysis accordingly, with just a bare reference to
Griggs. In particular, the court required the city to prove a compelling
government interest in order to avoid liability.
The Equal Protection cases were later overruled by Washington v.
4. Id. The defendant had also previously permitted whites to work in the various positions without
requiring a high school diploma or passing test scores. Id.
5. Id. at 431.
6. Id.
7. See generally Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.
1975), rev'd sub noma., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 271 (1977);
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, Miss., 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of
Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d
920 (2d Cir. 1968).
8. 508 F.2d 1179 (1974).
9. Id. at 1185 (internal quotations omitted).
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Davis,10 and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.,11 in which the Supreme Court refused to permit disparate
impact theory to be used for constitutional claims. Subsequent housing cases
thus had to rely more explicitly on the statutory basis for the theory,
specifically the similarities in purpose and text between Title VII and the
12
FHA.
In the decades that followed, every circuit to hear the issue upheld the
use of the disparate impact standard, although they employed different
formulas. In 2013, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
("HUD") enacted a regulation which explicitly endorsed the use of the
disparate impact theory and set forth the proper analytical framework. First,
the plaintiff must prove that a challenged practice either caused or is likely to
cause a disparate impact on a group of persons, or creates or perpetuates
segregated housing patterns based on protected characteristics. 3 If the
plaintiff makes this prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant to demonstrate that the challenged practice "isnecessary to achieve
one or more substantial, legitimate, non-discriminatory interests." 14 If the
defendant meets this burden the plaintiff may still prevail by demonstrating
that these interests "could be served by a practice that has a less
15
discriminatory effect."
B. Utility in FairHousing Law
Advocates have used disparate impact theory to challenge a variety of
practices under the FHA, including exclusionary zoning ordinances, the
administration of Section 8 vouchers, mortgage lending practices, occupancy
restrictions, and the demolition and siting of subsidized housing. 16 There are a
number of reasons why they find it particularly useful. What follows are
three of the most salient ones.
1. The Disparate Impact Theory Allows Advocates to Bypass Intent
From the litigator's point of view, perhaps the most significant
10.
11.
12.
and that

426 U.S. 229 (1976).
429U.S.252(1977).
Peter Mahoney argues that courts have failed to keep these two different theoretical origins distinct,
this has led the case law to be increasingly incoherent. The End(s) of DisparateImpact: Doctrinal

Reconstruction, FairHousing and Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409,

439-42 (1998).
13. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a), (c)(l) (2014).
14. Id.
§ 100.500(c)(2).
15. Id.
§ 100.500(c)(3).
16. Michael G. Allen, Jamie L. Crook, John P. Relman, Assessing HUD's DisparateImpact Rule: A

Practitioner'sPerspective, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 155, 157 (2014). The authors also argue that the
theory would be useful for challenging the use of criminal background checks by landlords (because of the
disparate impact on racial and ethnic minorities), and "disorderly conduct" policies, which require eviction of
tenants who call the police (because of the disparate impact on female victims of domestic violence). Id. at
190-95.
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advantage of the disparate impact theory is that it allows the plaintiff to avoid
the difficult task of having to prove that the defendant engaged in an act of
intentional discrimination. Intent and motivation can be notoriously difficult
to prove. Most actors today are savvy enough not to announce their
discriminatory intent. In the absence of direct evidence advocates must make
a circumstantial case, relying on the increasingly complex McDonnellDouglas burden-shifting analysis in which plaintiffs must essentially disprove
every possible legitimate reason for the defendant's actions. 17 This process is
difficult enough in cases involving an individual defendant; it becomes much
harder in cases with an institutional defendant, where there may be multiple
decision makers and decision-making processes. Simply identifying all of the
people who may have had input into a particular policy or participated in a
certain practice may be challenging in and of itself. Discerning the motives of
each may well prove impossible.18 Disparate impact theory permits the focus
to shift from what was in the minds of the actors to the consequences of their
actions.
Moreover, in the absence of direct evidence, a plaintiff's lawyer may be
reluctant to brand a defendant as a purposeful discriminator. Doing so will
almost certainly complicate settlement negotiations. It may also be seen as a
difficult reach to ask a jury to come to this potentially inflammatory
conclusion, particularly where the defendant is a government entity or
19
respected institution.
2. Disparate Impact Makes it Easier to Address Historic/Entrenched
Discriminatory Patterns
Fair housing advocates also support the disparate impact cause of action
because of its ability to reach long-standing patterns of residential
segregation.
Such patterns were invariably created through overtly
discriminatory practices. Once established, they can easily be perpetuated
through municipal policies which simply maintain the existing state of

17. The Supreme Court set forth the initial burden-shifting analysis for circumstantial cases of
intentional discrimination in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). This
formula was modified in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, which held that the defendant

need only articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason in order to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case of
discrimination. 450 U.S. 248, 253-56 (1981). The plaintiff's case was made even more difficult by St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, in which the Court held that even if the fact-finder disbelieves the legitimate
reason proffered by the defendant, a verdict for the plaintiff does not automatically follow. 509 U.S. 502,
519 (1993).
18. Brief of Respondents at 57, Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys Project., Inc.,
__ U.S. _ (2015) (No. 13-137 1) ("Proving intent can be time-consuming, costly, and unnecessary.").
19. Id. at 56-57 ("Inquiry into the motives of elected officials can be both difficult and
undesirable.... The judicial and executive authorities charged with enforcing the laws may be reluctant to
attribute racial intent to violate those laws on the part of state and local officials if they can avoid that
unseemly task and still reach a just result. Charges of intentional discrimination can have a divisive impact
on local communities.").

630
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20

affairs.
Because disparate impact theory focuses not on individual acts of
discrimination but on institutional policies and practices that affect whole
segments of the population, it is well-suited for disrupting these entrenched
patterns. And because it focuses only on effects and not state of mind,
disparate impact theory can reach the thoughtless bureaucrat or elected body
that unwittingly perpetuates the status quo.
As one group of advocates put it:
Many disparate impact claims relate to de facto conditions that are fairly
traceable to de jure practices that were imbedded in federal and state policies.
This is directly attributable to federal and state policies promoting racial
segregation, and overt segregative practices by private individuals.
Disparate impact, however, can fill the void and root out the discriminatory
origins undergirding current social conditions and structures. The ability to
bring claims against housing practices with highly racial effects is one of the
21
few effective means to investigate and address the legacy of dejure practices.

Another argued:
Because of the enduring effects of federal, state, and local policies and actions
that segregated metropolitan areas, subsequent public policies and private
actions perpetuate these residential patterns and frequently exacerbate
them.... Disparate impact claims require governmental entities to ensure they
neither perpetuate
patterns of residential segregation nor exacerbate them
22
inadvertently.

3. The Threat of Litigation Keeps Governmental and Institutional Actors
Accountable
A third benefit to disparate impact theory is that the mere threat of it
forces governmental and institutional actors to be mindful of the effects that
their policies may have on protected groups. This in turn encourages them to
elicit feedback from stakeholders, to closely examine their methods and
consider different alternatives, and in general to operate in a more transparent,
proactive, and inclusive manner.
For example, the American Planning Association notes that "[t]he
FHA's disparate-impact framework furthers transparency and legitimacy by
committing planning professionals and public institutions to a dialogue with

20. Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is DisparateImpact Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis of Forty
Years of DisparateImpact Claims Under the FairHousing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357, 416 (2013) ("A

twenty-first century local government bureaucrat or elected official did not create racial segregation in
housing, but he or she can virtually guarantee its perpetuation, with or without discriminatory purpose, by
simply engaging in practices that help maintain the residential status quo.").
21. Brief of NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 12-13,
Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys Project., Inc., _ U.S. _ (2015) (No. 13-1371).
22. Brief of Hous. Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 42, Tex. Dep't of Hous. &
Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys Project., Inc.,
_ U.S. _ (2015) (No. 13-1371); see also id at 43
("Disparate impact claims ...are essential to redress and disestablish entrenched patterns of residential
segregation.").
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those affected by their actions." 23 It goes on to argue that "[t]he disparateimpact standard encourages planners and developers to engage proactively
with communities affected by development plans," and "creates incentives for
institutions and developers to share their findings with stakeholders and to
explore less burdensome alternatives in an effort to obtain community
support."

24

Institutional actors in the mortgage and insurance fields agree, arguing
that, "[t]o the extent that the housing, lending, and insurance industries have
become fairer and more efficient in recent years-and they have-the
disparate impact doctrine, and the principles underlying it, have driven much
of that progress." 25 In particular, they point out that the disparate impact
doctrine has "given entities an incentive to internalize fair housing principles
26
and critically evaluate their own policies."
III.

DISPARATE IMPACT IN DANGER

A. The Supreme Court

The last few years have caused concern for supporters of disparate
impact theory. Unlike Title VII, the FHA was never amended to clearly
permit disparate impact theory. Despite the unanimous recognition of the
theory by the federal circuits, the Supreme Court has recently granted
certiorari in three cases in which the primary or sole issue for review was
whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA. This has
caused considerable distress among the fair housing advocacy community, as
there appears to be no reason for the Court to hear this issue unless it is
considering disallowing or restricting the use of disparate impact theory in
FHA cases.
The first two cases were settled prior to oral argument. The third was
heard on January 12, 2015, and at the time of this writing, a decision is
pending from the Court. All three cases will be briefly reviewed here.
27
1. Magner v. Gallagher

In 2003, the City of St. Paul, Minnesota established a new executive
23. Brief of the Am. Planning Assoc. and Hous. Land Advocates as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 5, Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys Project., Inc.,
_
U.S. __
(2015) (No. 13-1371).
24. Id. at 12; see id. at 14 ("The FHA's disparate-impact framework is critical to ensuring that
transparency and inclusiveness remain part of the planning and development landscape.").
25. Brief of the Nat'l Fair Hous. Alliance, Ctr. for Cmty. Self-Help, and Hope Enter. Corp. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 17, Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys Project., Inc.,
U.S._ (2015) (No. 13-1371).

26. Id. at 18.
27. 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010). This summary is based on the facts as set forth in the appellate court
opinion as well as the briefs filed by the parties to the Supreme Court. See id
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agency to administer the city's housing code. The agency increased the level
of housing code enforcement targeted at rental properties. In addition to
responding to citizen complaints about properties, the agency inspectors
conducted proactive sweeps for housing code violations. The inspectors were
instructed to write up every observed violation-not just what was called inand to write up all nearby properties-not just the reported property. The
agency also increased enforcement efforts regarding so-called "problem
properties," in an attempt to force property owners to take greater
responsibility for their properties or to compel changes in ownership. It
employed a variety of tactics to this end, including orders to correct or abate
conditions, condemnations, fees, tenant evictions, real estate seizures,
revocations of rental agreements, and court actions.
The plaintiffs were current and former owners of rental property that was
subject to the city's housing codes. They rented their properties primarily to
low-income households, a disproportionate percentage of whom were black.
As a result of the city's code enforcement, the plaintiffs were subjected to
increased maintenance costs, fees, condemnations, and forced sales of their
properties. The plaintiffs alleged that the city's code enforcement practices
violated the FHA because they created a disparate impact on racial minorities.
Specifically, they argued that the city had an affordable housing shortage, that
blacks made up a disproportionate percentage of households in the city that
relied on affordable housing, that the city's code enforcement practices
increased costs for property owners who rent to low-income tenants, and that
this increased burden resulted in less affordable housing in the city, resulting
in a disproportionate adverse effect on black city residents.
2. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action v. Township of Mt. Holly, New
28
Jersey
This case arose out of a plan by the Township of Mt. Holly, New Jersey
to redevelop one of its neighborhoods, an area called Mt. Holly Gardens ("the
Gardens"), which contained 329 townhouses. In 2000, the Gardens had
approximately 1605 residents, 46 percent of whom were black and 29 percent
of whom were Hispanic (as compared with 21 percent and 9 percent,
respectively, in the Township overall). Almost all of the Gardens' residents
were low-income, and most were classified as "very low" or "extremely low"
income.
The Gardens was built in the 1950s, and by the 1990s the neighborhood
had begun to fall into disrepair. More than half of the properties were rentals
and many were owned by absentee landlords who did not maintain them well.

28. 658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011). This summary is based on the facts as set forth in the appellate court
opinion, as well as the briefs filed by the parties to the Supreme Court. See id.

2015]

Beyond DisparateImpact

A lack of parking led some residents to pave their backyards for use as
driveways, which in turn led to drainage problems. There was no
homeowners association to provide for the upkeep of common areas or alleys.
Overcrowding, vacancies, and crime were all problems. Despite community
attempts to revitalize and police the area, it continued to deteriorate.
Nevertheless, the population of the Gardens was relatively stable: 81 percent
of the homeowners had lived in their homes for at least nine years, and 72
percent of renters had lived there for at least five years.
In 2000, the Township commissioned a study to determine whether the
Gardens was an area in need of redevelopment under New Jersey law. The
resulting report concluded that the area did indeed offer a "significant
opportunity for redevelopment" because of blight, excess land coverage, poor
land use, and excess crime. 29 The Township then adopted a series of
redevelopment plans, ultimately settling on the Revised West Rancocas
Redevelopment Plan (the "Plan"). The Plan called for the acquisition and
demolition of all of the existing homes in the Gardens. A new community
called the Villages at Parker's Mill would be built in its place, consisting of
520 new townhomes and apartments.
It was clear that the vast majority of the Gardens' residents would be
permanently displaced by the Plan. While existing homes in the Gardens sold
for between $64,000 and $81,000, the estimated cost of a new home in the
Villages was between $200,000 and $275,000. Only 56 of the 520 newlyconstructed units would be deed-restricted affordable housing units, and just
eleven of these would be offered on a priority basis to existing Gardens
residents. It was also clear that a significant amount of demographic shift
would likely occur in the neighborhood. The residents contended that only 29
percent of minority households in the area would be able to afford housing in
the redeveloped Villages, whereas 79 percent of the white households could
afford to live there.
DepartmentofHousing
3. The Inclusive Communities Project,Inc. v. Texas
30
Affairs
and Community
The Plaintiff, Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. ("Inclusive
Communities"), is a non-profit organization that's mission is to further racial
and socioeconomic integration in the Dallas metropolitan area. In particular,
Inclusive Communities assists low-income families, a significant number of
which are black, who are eligible for the Dallas Housing Authority's Housing
Choice Voucher Program (commonly referred to as "Section 8 Vouchers") in
finding affordable housing in predominantly white suburban neighborhoods.
29. Id. at 379.
30. 747 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014). This summary is based on the facts as set forth in the appellate court
opinion, as well as the briefs filed by the parties to the Supreme Court. See id.
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A development that receives a Low-Income Housing Tax Credit ("LIHTC")
cannot refuse to accept tenants because of their use of Section 8 Vouchers.
As a result, it is important to Inclusive Communities where LIHTC
developments are located.
Competition for LIHTCs is fierce. The Texas Department of Housing
and Community Affairs ("the Department") awards LIHTCs according to a
complex formula governed by both state and federal statutes. For the most
desirable LIHTC, the 9 percent credit, federal law requires that designated
agencies adopt a Qualified Allocation Plan ("QAP") which includes particular
selection criteria and preferences. Texas state law requires the Department to
first determine whether an application satisfies the threshold criteria in the
QAP. Then it must use a point system in order to score and rank qualifying
applications, specifically by prioritizing eleven statutory criteria (referred to
as "above-the-line" criteria) in descending order. The Department may use
additional "below-the-line" criteria to supplement its decision making, but
none of these criteria may outweigh any "above-the-line" factors.
Inclusive Communities brought a disparate impact claim against the
Department in 2008, alleging that the Department disproportionately
approved
LIHTCs
in
minority-concentrated
neighborhoods
and
disproportionately disapproved them in predominantly white neighborhoods.
Inclusive Communities alleged that from 1995 to 2009, the Department did
not allocate any LIHTC for units in predominantly white census tracts within
the City of Dallas. As a result, by 2008 more than 92 percent of LIHTC units
in Dallas were located in minority census tracts. When looking at the metro
area as a whole, from 1999 to 2008 the Department approved tax credits for
49.7 percent of proposed units in areas that were at least 90 percent minority,
but only approved 37.4 percent of proposed units in areas that were at least 90
percent white. Thus, the Department's allocation practices have caused lowincome housing to be concentrated in minority areas and less available in
white areas, which in turn maintains and perpetuates segregated housing
patterns.
The Department countered that any statistical disparity in LIHTC
allocation arose directly from federal and state laws that required the
Department to use fixed criteria, some of which are correlated with race, in its
decision making. Specifically, federal law requires the state's QAP to give
preference to projects built in low-income areas, and these areas often contain
a disproportionately high number of minority residents.
B. Criticisms andFailures
Fair housing advocates are understandably worried about the future of
disparate impact theory in light of the conservative Supreme Court's recent
activity and the pending Inclusive Communities case. But this concern for the
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theory's viability may be diverting attention from other, equally valid
concerns about the theory's utility. We can fear disparate impact's demise
and simultaneously be honest about the theory's shortcomings and limitations,
for even if it does survive, these problems will still remain.
1. Theoretical
Disparate impact theory, in both housing and employment, has been
subject to a good deal of academic criticism. Some clearly take issue with the
theory because they feel it goes too far, and would seek in general to limit
discrimination-based causes of action. The more interesting criticism for my
purposes here is criticism which comes from people who are otherwise
supportive of expansive civil rights enforcement, but who perceive flaws in
the way disparate impact theory seeks to accomplish it. For example,
Professor Michael Selmi argued, in an influential article, that the focus on
disparate impact in the 1970s diverted attention away from the theory of
disparate treatment. 3 1 This was especially problematic given the fact that in
many of the early impact cases there actually was a fair amount of evidence of
32
intentional discrimination behind the ostensibly neutral practices at issue.
For example, in Black Jack there was significant evidence of discriminatory
intent behind the municipality's zoning ordinance on the part of the citizens
and municipal leaders of Black Jack. 33 Griggs itself involved an employer
that had engaged in overtly discriminatory practices until the day Title VII
took effect, at which time it adopted the facially neutral practices that served
no purpose other than to entrench the prior segregated patterns it had
34
created.
These courts had the opportunity to define intentional discrimination
more broadly, to include intentionally engaging in an ostensibly-neutral
practice with the knowledge and/or intent that it will create a discriminatory
effect. Instead, they chose to define the challenged conduct as something
entirely different: as completely neutral acts which cause a disparate impact,
in which intent or motive is irrelevant. The availability of disparate impact
theory allowed courts and advocates to side-step difficult issues of proof and
motive in discrimination cases, but this came at the price of truncating
disparate treatment theory. Paradoxically, then, disparate impact theory may

31. See generallyMichael Selmi, Was The DisparateImpact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REv. 701
(2006).
32. This approach, of bringing disparate impact claims even in cases with evidence of discriminatory
intent because the impact claim is seen as easier to prove, has been referred to as "evidentiary dragnet". See
Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and DisparateImpact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 518-23
(2003).
33. United States v. City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 n.3 (8th Cir. 1974) ("The
uncontradicted evidence indicates that, at all levels of opposition, race played a significant role, both in the
drive to incorporate and the decision to rezone.").
34. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 431,428-32 (1971).

Washburn Law Journal

[Vol. 54

have actually contributed to the very problems with proof in disparate
treatment cases that are invoked to justify its existence in the first place.
Professor Selmi also took issue with the notion that it is beneficial to
avoid tying liability for disparate impact claims to moral blame.3 5 While it
may make it easier for plaintiffs to negotiate with defendants or for courts to
hand down liability rulings-because they can avoid labelling the defendant
as a discriminator-in the long run it leads to a skewed perception of what
blameworthy discriminatory behavior is. As a result, the very concept has
become underdeveloped, both in law and in public discourse, and today is
36
seen as constituting only obvious, intentional, animus-based discrimination.
We are left with a situation in which overt racism, such as the use of racial
epithets caught on tape or discovered in an email, will elicit strong and
immediate condemnation, but anything less is viewed as morally neutral and
therefore not "discrimination" at all. Because displays of overt animus-based
discrimination are increasingly rare, this may leave the impression that
intentional discrimination-the racist behavior of old-scarcely exists.37 As a
result, systemic racial inequities and the policies and practices that further
them simply fade into the background of modem society, and large segments
of the American populace are convinced that discrimination is a thing of the
past.
2. Practical
Perhaps more problematic than the theoretical criticisms of disparate
impact, from an advocate's standpoint at least, is the fact that disparate impact
claims are seldom brought. When plaintiffs do bring them, they are likely to
be ineffectual.
Professor Stacy Seicshnaydre recently conducted an exhaustive review
of every FHA case in the last forty years to reach the federal courts of appeals
in which a disparate impact claim was made. 3 8 The results were not
encouraging from a plaintiffs perspective: plaintiffs received positive
decisions in less than 20 percent of the disparate impact claims considered on
appeal. 39 This statistic fails to capture the state of play today, as the numbers
have been steadily dropping over time. Most of the successes occurred in the
1970s and 80s. By the 1990s the success rate had dropped to 13 percent, and

35. Selmi, supranote 31, at 773.
36. See id at 776 ("[T]he effort to expand the theory led to judicial neglect of the disparate treatment
theory, and also created the false impression that disparate treatment equaled animus."); see also id. at 782
("The creation of the disparate impact theory... has contributed to a stiflingly limited view of intentional
discrimination, one that even today is tied to animus and conscious motives, and one that leaves us awash in
racial and gender inequities but without any clear sense of responsibility or liability for those inequities.").
37. Id. at 774 ("The turn away from blame was even more problematic in that it implied that intentional
discrimination was a thing of the past.").
38. See generally Seicshnaydre, supra note 20.
39. Id. at 393.
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40
by the 2000s it was down to just over 8 percent.
Another useful way to look at how plaintiffs fare is by comparing the
affirmance and reversal rate of plaintiff-favorable district court rulings to
those of rulings that favor defendants. While the overall affirmance rate for
federal civil appeals is roughly 80 percent, plaintiffs have gotten affirmances
of favorable lower court decisions only 33.3 percent of the time. Defendants,
41
in contrast, have an affirmance rate of 83.8 percent.
Disparate impact claims in other areas of the law, specifically
employment discrimination, have not fared much better. In the employment
setting they have had limited impact outside of the context of employment
tests, with plaintiffs prevailing at the appellate level in only 19.2 percent of
cases. 4 2 As with the housing cases, the numbers look even worse when we
look to more recent decades. In 1994-95 the plaintiff success rate was only
10 percent, and in 1999-2001 it was 15.6 percent. 43 The district court data
for employment disparate impact claims are similarly underwhelming.
Plaintiffs prevailed in only 25.1 percent of cases, but this figure counts simply
surviving summary judgment as a win. When those cases are taken out, the
plaintiffs' success rate on the merits drops to 16.9 percent. And when the
analysis is restricted to more recent decades, that number falls further still, to
44
13.3 percent.
There are a number of possible explanations for this poor showing. One
is that disparate impact cases are often highly technical and therefore difficult
to bring. In order to state a prima facie case, an advocate must use what may
be a complex statistical analysis to define the potentially affected group of
people. Failure to properly determine the affected groups will prove fatal to
the plaintiffs case. 45 When it comes to countering the defense of legitimate
business necessity, the advocate needs to have a close understanding of the
intricacies of the defendant's undertaking-whether it be municipal zoning
and development, loan or insurance underwriting, etc.-an area in which the
defendant is very likely to have superior information.
Courts may be developing an intolerance to the disparate impact cause of
action, and might be increasingly unwilling to ascribe liability to defendants
who have not clearly shown themselves to be "blameworthy" in the sense

40. Id. at 393-94.
41. Id. at 398-99. In other words, as Professor Seieshnaydre notes, plaintiffs were able to reverse only
16.2 percent of adverse lower court decisions, while defendants were able to reverse 66.7 percent of adverse
lower court decisions. Id. at 399.
42. Selmi, supra note 31, at 738. It is also worth noting that of these, more than half (60 percent) were
remands rather than outright victories. Id. The defense victories, on the other hand, tended to be affirmance
of summary judgment (59 percent) and the preservation of defense verdicts (38 percent). Id.
43.

Id.

44. Id. at 739.
45.

Presentation by John P. Rellman, DisparateImpact: What it Means and How it Can Be Used

Effectively, for the John Marshall School of Law's Fair Housing Legal Support Center & Clinic's Annual
Conference, "The Metrics of Inequality", Slide 7 (Sept. 12, 2014). PowerPoint slides of the presentation are
on file with the author.
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discussed above. 46 It may also be that some plaintiffs' lawyers are
overplaying their hand, bringing cases against defendants who are attempting
to address legitimate concerns and who have few other options.4 7 These cases
represent advocates making questionable decisions about whether to even
pursue a disparate impact cause of action in the first place, which may
contribute to judicial mistrust of the theory.
Of course, the numbers cited above do not tell the whole story. Many
cases settle before ever reaching the summary judgment or trial phase, so
FHA plaintiffs proceeding under disparate impact theory may be achieving
favorable results through settlement. 48 And it is clear that many institutional
actors, from municipal planning organizations to mortgage lenders and
insurance underwriters, have made fundamental changes to the ways they
operate as a result of the threat of disparate impact liability. 49 Thus, disparate
impact theory has surely had more of an impact than the stark litigation
numbers would indicate. Nevertheless, the infrequency of use and success of
the disparate impact theory does suggest that it has failed to live up to its
promise.
IV.

WHAT NEXT?

Against this background of disparate impact theory's theoretical flaws
and practical ineffectiveness, not to mention the existential threat posed by the
Supreme Court, we would do well to focus on alternatives to disparate impact
theory in housing discrimination cases. We must begin by acknowledging
what we like about the theory-the uses that it serves and the goals that it
promotes. As discussed previously, disparate impact theory has long been
valued for its ability to get around the evidentiary and proof problems created
by a too-difficult intent standard. Disparate impact theory also makes it easier
to address historic and/or entrenched discriminatory patterns. Finally, it may
46. Mahoney, supra note 12 at 420 ("Disparate impact theory is reaching a crossroads. It either must
undergo substantial theoretical reformulation, or it inevitably will be applied with standards of proof
sufficiently rigorous to ensure that any defendant found liable is likely to have engaged in practices that are
functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.").
47. Rellman, supra note 45, at Slides 15-16. John Rellman cited Gallagherv. Magner as an example
of this. The case involved a challenge to the City of St. Paul's application of its property maintenance code
to force landlords to remediate slum conditions in their properties, which were disproportionately occupied
by minority group members. Id. By all accounts, the properties were seriously distressed, which was causing
their occupants-the parties upon whom the landlords were basing their disparate impact claim-a good deal
of harm.
48. The dismal statistics for plaintiff success rates at trial and summary judgment, however, would
almost certainly weaken their bargaining position at settlement. On the other hand, perhaps the strongest
plaintiff cases settle, and thus the pool that reaches summary judgment is weaker and more prone to yield a
defense victory. Further research would be needed to establish any clear patterns in this regard.
49. Brief of The Am. Planning Ass'n. and Hous. Land Advocates as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 12-13, Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys Project., Inc.,_ U.S.
(2015) (No. 13-1371); Brief of Nat'l Fair Hous. Alliance, Ctr. for Cmty. Self-Help, and Hope Enter. Corp. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 12, Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys
Project., Inc., __ U.S. _ (2015) (No. 13-1371).
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be a way of keeping governmental and institutional actors accountable for the
consequences of their policies. The remainder of this article will be spent
identifying alternative mechanisms for achieving these goals.
A. Redefine "Intent"

One of the most desirable aspects of disparate impact theory from an
advocate's standpoint is that it helps to get around the practical difficulties in
locating a biased actor and pinpointing a specific intentionally discriminatory
act. Yet this also has led to a strict bifurcation of claims-into those with
intent and those without-that fails to reflect real-life practices and that has
stunted our understanding of what it means to "discriminate."
One solution might be for advocates and academics to press for the
recognition of a mens rea spectrum for actionable discrimination. Rather than
trying to fit all discrimination claims into either the "intent" category of
disparate treatment or the "strict liability" category of disparate impact, we
might acknowledge that discrimination can-and often does-more closely
resemble negligent or reckless conduct. 50 For example, a municipality that
undertakes a development plan without even considering the impact that the
plan will have on minority residents might be described as behaving
negligently. A mortgage company that continues to use underwriting criteria
that it knows have very little correlation to risk and which screen out large
percentages of minority applicants can easily be seen as behaving recklessly.
One clear benefit of this approach is that it corresponds with the legal
system's traditional way of conceptualizing tort liability, which recognizes
that a defendant can "do wrong" through indifference or carelessness as well
as deliberation. This also provides a much more accurate description of the
conduct that is typically pursued under disparate impact theory. As such, it
may offer a more satisfying framework for lawyers, judges, juries, and the
51
public at large to understand these cases.
This approach has its challenges, too, the most significant of which is
that courts would need to define the duty of care. If we start with the
assumption that the FHA creates a duty not to discriminate in housing, we are
still left with the definition of what it means "to discriminate." Thus, we may
have to circle back to whether this definition should include conduct that
50. For an argument in favor of incorporating a negligence standard in employment discrimination
cases, see generally David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 899 (1993).
51. It may, however, be a hard sell to the Supreme Court. The Court has stated previously that
"'Discriminatory purpose,' however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of
consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action or at
least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Pers.
Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (internal citations omitted) (refusing to allow a claim of
intentional discrimination in an equal protection case alleging that a state's preference for veterans in civil
service hiring discriminated against women, in which the defendant state clearly knew that the veterans
preference would disproportionately benefit men).
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causes disparate outcomes. Even if the duty not to discriminate in housing is
interpreted to mean the duty to avoid any housing-related action which harms
members of an identified protected group (much like ordinary negligence
doctrine requires people to avoid inflicting harm) we would still need to
determine what constitutes reasonable care. 52 These challenges are not
insurmountable, however, given that courts already undertake this same
analysis in tort cases.
Advocates seeking to redefine intent should also be vigorous in
advancing theories of implicit bias. Social scientists have demonstrated that
implicit or unconscious bias affects virtually everyone in society. 53 Because
these biases operate at the subconscious level, describing the actions that
people take as a result in terms of "intent" or "motivation" fails to accurately
capture the reality of the cognitive processes at work. 54 So-called "social
framework evidence" by social psychologists can educate judges and juries in
the myriad of ways in which a person can honestly believe he or she is acting
in a nondiscriminatory manner, yet still be treating members of a particular
55
group in a negative way.
Extreme care should be taken, however, not to equate implicit bias with
disparate impact. The two theories accomplish very different functions,
however because both arise in the absence of clear animus, motivation, or
intent, courts and academics easily confuse them. 56 Implicit bias is useful to
explain an actor's disparate treatment of minority individual or group
members in the absence of clear evidence that the actor intended to treat the
person or group differently. Disparate impact is used when facially neutral
policies have a discriminatory effect on minority groups. Over the last few
decades, advocates and courts have confused the two, and applied disparate
impact analysis in cases alleging biased, subjective decision making with no
obvious sign of intentional discrimination. This creates a number of
problems: it sows doctrinal confusion, creates a disconnect between the theory
and the reality of how discrimination is likely to operate, and fails to
adequately address the deficiencies of the old discrimination framework that
52. Jessie Allen, Note, A Possible Remedy for Unthinking Discrimination,61 BROOK. L. REv. 1299,
1322-24 (1995).
53. The seminal work on this subject is Charles R. Lawrence HI's article, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection:Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
54. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1187-90 (1995).
55. An example of this would be when an employer consistently rates black applicants lower on
subjective measures of fitness for a position such as "intelligence" or "communication skills." The employer
may have no idea that she is doing this, and harbor no conscious ill-will toward black people, but still do this.
Even though there is no evidence of discriminatory intent, this would not be an appropriate case for disparate
impact theory, because there is no facially neutral policy at work-the candidates are in fact being treated
differently, just for reasons that are not immediately obvious.
56. An example of this is the case ofEEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, in which the lower court confused the
two theories (in large part because the EEOC confused them when it filed the case) and the court of appeals
had to work mightily to untangle them. See generally 969 F. Supp. 727 (S.D. Fla. 1997) and 220 F.3d 1263
(1 lthCir. 2000).

20151

Beyond DisparateImpact

relied on proof of intent.
As Professor Linda Hamilton Krieger argues:
The disparate impact paradigm as currently constructed is an inappropriate
analytical tool for addressing the intergroup biases inherent in subjective
decisionmaking....
From a practical standpoint, disparate impact theory is inadequate because the
empirical tools on which it depends cannot effectively or economically be
applied in situations involving complex, subjective assessments. Further, it is
only disparate impact's grounding in empiricism which provides its political
legitimacy as a civil rights theory in the face of competing normative claims.
Finally, as a theoretical matter... disparate impact theory is the wrong tool to
address subjective decisionmaking because it presupposes a significantly
different type of bias from those at play in subjective practices cases. From a
phenomenological standpoint, subjective practices discrimination is a disparate
treatment problem,57not a disparate impact problem, and it requires a disparate
treatment solution.

It is thus important for fair housing advocates to realize that there is
often a more appropriate tool for addressing cases that "look like"
discrimination but lack clear evidence of discriminatory intent. This not only
preserves the important analytical distinction between the two theories, it will
hopefully assist courts and juries in coming to a better understanding of the
complicated ways in which discrimination can manifest itself. And this is
particularly important to keep in mind if disparate impact theory does, in fact,
meet its demise.
B. Agency Practice
Advocates value disparate impact theory for its potential to reach deeply
entrenched and long-standing discriminatory patterns. As such, many
disparate impact cases have been brought against municipalities for their
decisions involving zoning, resource allocation, urban renewal projects, and
the siting of low-income, public, and affordable housing. Many of these
undertakings are accomplished under the auspices of federal housing funding
programs, which are overseen by HUD. Thus, agency practice may provide
one promising alternative mechanism for achieving this goal, particularly in
light of the renewed focus on HUD's mission to affirmatively further fair
58
housing.
HUD is responsible for the distribution and oversight of several key
sources of federal housing funds, the most significant of which is the
57. Krieger, supra note 54 at 1231.

58. Professor Olatunde Johnson has pointed out that agency practice is particularly important in
providing context for disparate impact theory. She argues that disparate impact theory was not simply a
court-created doctrine, but also a reasonable implementation choice for agencies that were charged with
helping to enforce broad civil rights laws. The Agency Roots of DisparateImpact, 49 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 125, 126-27, 132-40 (2014). Moreover, she sees HUD as uniquely competent, relative to courts, to use
its rule-making authority "to stabilize disparate impact law and to provide clarity to regulated entities subject
to different judicial standards." Id. at 127, 151-53.
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Community Development Block Grant ("CDBG"). The CDBG program's
mandate is to help local governments develop "viable urban communities, by
providing decent housing and a suitable living environment and expanding
economic opportunities, principally for persons of low and moderate
income." 59 The funds, which totaled $3 billion for fiscal year 2014, are
60
distributed to roughly 1200 jurisdictions across the country.
The FHA contains a provision, § 3608, which directs HUD to administer
its programs and activities relating to housing and urban development "in a
manner affirmatively to further the [FHA's] policies." 6 1 The statute that
created the CDBG also requires grant recipients to certify to HUD that their
grant will be administered in conformity with the FHA and that the recipient
62
will use the funds in such a manner to "affirmatively further fair housing."
Although the term "affirmatively further fair housing" is not defined, the
legislative history of the FHA makes clear that Congress intended for the
statute both to eradicate housing discrimination and to foster integrated living
patterns. 63 In 1995 HUD adopted a set of regulations which required grant
recipients, as part of their certification to HUD, to conduct an Analysis of
Impediments (often referred to as an "Al") to fair housing in their jurisdiction,
to take action to address the conditions identified as impediments, and to
64
maintain adequate records of their analysis and actions.
Despite this clear statutory and regulatory mandate, the grant recipients'
record of compliance with the certification requirements has been "mixed at
best."'65 Indeed, the persistent and pervasive nature of residential racial
segregation across the nation, in the thousands of communities receiving
billions of dollars in CDBG monies for decades, belies the notion that these
jurisdictions were all working diligently to decrease segregation. And for
many years HUD did virtually nothing to ensure compliance or to take action
66
against recipients who failed to comply.
All of this changed in 2006, when a ground-breaking suit was brought by
a private fair housing group against one such grant recipient, Westchester
County, New York. The suit alleged that Westchester County had applied for
59. 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c) (2012).
60. See Community Development Allocations and Appropriations, HUD.GOv (last visited May 31,

2015)
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HLD?src=/program offices/comm planning/communitydevelopment/budget.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5).
62. Id. § 5304(b)(2).
63. Robert G. Schwemm, Overcoming Structural Barriers to Integrated Housing: A Back-To-TheFuture Reflection on the Fair Housing Act's "Affirmatively Further" Mandate, 100 Ky. L.J. 125, 127-28

(2011-2012) (noting that Congress passed the FHA shortly after the National Commission on Civil Disorders
published its famous report describing the United States as increasingly segregated, and calling for "open
housing" legislation to remedy this problem).
64. 24 C.F.R. §§ 570.904(c), 570.506(g) (2014).
65. Schwemm, supra note 63, at 153 (noting that a GAO audit determined that a majority of Als were
inadequate and/or outdated).
66. Id. at 153-54 (noting that few grants were denied or rescinded, and no noncompliant grantees were
threatened with remedial action).
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CDBG funds every year, from 2000 to 2006, and each time had certified that
it would use the funds in a manner which affirmatively furthered fair housing.
It had not, however, analyzed its impediments to fair housing choice nor had
it taken appropriate action to overcome these impediments. The district court
ultimately found that Westchester County had taken $52 million of CDBG
money and used it in a way which only further exacerbated its already high
levels of racial segregation. 67 In 2009, after President Obama took office, the
U.S. Department of Justice on behalf of HUD moved to intervene in the
litigation. A settlement agreement was reached which required Westchester
to implement a housing policy that combats racial segregation, to spend $51.6
million to develop affordable housing units in municipalities with white
populations, and to pay $10 million to the fair housing organization that
68
originally brought the suit.
The Westchester suit was unique in that it was brought under the federal
False Claims Act, based on non-public information obtained by the plaintiff
which made clear that Westchester's certifications had been knowingly false.
It is unlikely that such a fact pattern will readily repeat itself. The case,
however, represented a shot across the bow to local governments who receive
CDBG funds, brought a heightened awareness to advocates about HUD's
responsibility to police program recipients, and seemed to re-energize HUD
officials.69

The hope is that HUD will continue to take its "affirmatively furthering"
mandate seriously: by promulgating clear standards that will help ensure
greater compliance, 70 devoting sufficient resources to reviewing grant
recipients' certifications, and taking appropriate action against those who fail
to comply. Advocates can and should monitor and publicize whether the
agency is doing so. 7 1 While there is no private right of action to enforce
§ 3608 directly in court, 72 privately-initiated administrative complaints can be
67. Specifically, Westchester had sited all of the affordable housing units that it had developed in its
few majority-minority neighborhoods, which already contained virtually all of the affordable and low-income
housing in Westchester.
68. See Stipulation & Order of Settlement & Dismissal, United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr.
of Metro New York, Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 4-5 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
69. Housing Fairness Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 476 Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty.
Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 110 (2010) (statement by HUD Assistant Sec'y for
Fair Hous. and Equal Opportunity John D. Trasvina) ("HUD has not always fulfilled its obligation to ensure
that our money is spent in ways that affirmatively further fair housing. In this new day, however, there is a
Department-wide commitment to incorporate our mandate to affirmatively furthering fair housing into all of
our work so that we can fulfill our shared goal of truly integrated and balanced living patterns.").
70. HUD has proposed such a Rule, but despite a Final Action date of March 2015, has yet to
promulgate it at the time of this writing. See Hous. & URB. DEV. DEP'T., Affirmatively FurtheringFair

Housing, (July 19, 2013) available at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/07/19/20131675 I/affirmatively-furthering-fair-housing.
71. Some have recently done so, and they describe HUD's record as "mixed." See generally Philip
Tegler, Megan Haberle, & Ebony Gayles, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing in HUD Housing
Programs: A First Term Report Card, 22 J. AFFORDABLE HOuS. & COMMUNITY DEv. L. 27 (2013);
Schwemm, supra note 63 at 169.

72. See NAACP, Bos. Chapter v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 152-54 (1st Cir.
1987); Shannon v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 820 (3d Cir. 1970); Greater New Orleans
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filed with HUD. 73 Finally, if HUD should falter in its responsibility, § 3608based claims can be filed against it and reviewed under the Administrative
74
Procedure Act.
Another potential option for private enforcement of § 3608 is through
suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 7 5 Courts have been divided on the
issue, 76 and the Supreme Court has not spoken on it. The question ultimately
comes down to an interpretation of the Court's opinion in Gonzaga University
v. Doe,7 7 and whether this portion of the FHA provides an "unambiguously
conferred right" to be enforceable under § 1983.
Finally, HUD can make improvements to its rental assistance programs
so that these programs themselves do not exacerbate racial and economic
segregation. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities recommends a
number of policy changes that will encourage low-income families who use
Housing Choice Vouchers to move to lower-poverty communities, which will
in many (if not most) cases decrease racial segregation. 7 8 For example, HUD
could reward agencies that help families move to so-called "high opportunity
areas" with additional funding, and extend the search period allowed for
families who seek to make such moves. 79 At the same time, HUD could
revise its metro-wide fair market rent system, and modify its administrative
geography to reduce the extent to which existing service area boundaries
interfere with agencies' abilities to help families move into high opportunity
80
areas.

Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 723 F. Supp. 2d 14, 26 (D.D.C. 2010), affdin
part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 639 F.3d 1078, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of
Hous. & Urb. Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 418 (D. Md. 2005); Pleune v. Pierce, 697 F. Supp. 113, 119-20
(E.D.N.Y. 1988); Lee v. Pierce, 698 F. Supp. 332, 342 (D.D.C. 1988). Congres's considered an amendment
that would have provided for a private right of action to enforce § 3608 in 2010, but it did not pass. See
Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME) Act, H.R. 6500, 11 1th Cong. §3(0 (2010) (proposing to amend
the FHA's definition of a discriminatory housing practice to include "a failure to comply with [§ 3608(e)(5)]
or a regulation made to carry out [§ 3608(e)(5)]").
73. 42 U.S.C. §3610. See Schwemm, supra note 63, at 166 (noting that as of April 2011, fourteen
privately-initiated §3608 claims were pending with HUD). The website for Rellman, Dane & Colfax, a
prominent fair housing firm, listed four affirmatively furthering complaints the firm has pending before HUD
as of March 2015. See http://www.relmanlaw.com/afth/afthenforcment.php.
74. NAACP, Bos. Chapter,817 F.2d at 157-60; Shannon, 436 F.2d at 818-20.
75. For a discussion of the issue and argument in favor of this option, see generally Michelle Ghaznavi
Collins, Opening Doors to FairHousing: Enforcing the Affirmatively FurtherProvision of the FairHousing
Act Through 42 U.S.C. 1983, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 2135 (2010).
76. Compare Wallace v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 298 F. Supp. 2d 710, 718 (N.D. I11.2003), and
Langolais v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 52-53 (D. Mass. 2002), and Anderson v. Jackson,
No. 06-3298, 2007 WL 458232, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2007) (finding § 3608 enforceable through § 1983),
with S. Middlesex Opportunity Council, Inc. v. Town of Framingham, No. 07-12018, 2008 WL 4595369, at
*14 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2008), and Thomas v. Butzen, No. 04 C 5555, 2005 WL 2387676, at *7-11 (N.D. I11.
Sept. 26,2005) (finding § 3608 not enforceable through § 1983).
77. 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
78. See generally Barbara Sard & Douglas Rice, Creating Opportunityfor Children: How Housing
Location Can Make a Difference, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES (Oct. 15, 2015)
http://www.cbpp.org/research/creating-opportunity-for-children?fa=view&id=421 1.
79. Id
80. Id.
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C. Coalition-Buildingand The PoliticalProcess
A third benefit of disparate impact theory is that the very threat of it has
forced institutional and governmental actors to be more transparent,
responsive, and accountable to their various constituent groups, particularly
communities of color who might be affected by their policies and practices.
The challenge, then, is for advocates to continue to hold these entities
accountable and ensure that their decision making processes are fair in the
absence of a litigation threat.
There are a number of ways that this goal can be met, many of which
advocates have been pursuing for some time, with varying degrees of success.
The most obvious, at least with respect to local governments, is through direct
citizen participation in the processes of planning and community
development. How this is accomplished has varied over time. Early attempts
by the federal government to encourage citizen involvement in planning and
development decisions included vague mandates in the Model Cities
development funding program, the CDBG program, and the Empowerment
Zone program-all of which suffered from too little structure and almost
81
nonexistent enforcement.
In the 1990s, more modem models of planning through consensus
building came through efforts by the planning community. 82 Under the basic
model, individual stakeholders engage in a deliberative process using trained
facilitators in order to "create options, develop criteria for choice, and make
the decisions on which they can all agree." 83 This approach has been
successfully used in a number of cases across the country, including plans for
affordable housing, siting waste treatment facilities, growth management, and
management of water resources. 84 An updated version of this is the
neighborhood collaborative planning movement. This movement "blends
computer-based neighborhood indicator systems technology and alternative
dispute resolution consensus-building techniques with traditional planning
85
theories and processes."
These processes are far from perfect. To succeed, they require proper
design and careful implementation.
By design, they mandate nonprofessional input into technical areas that typically require training and
expertise. By bringing together vastly different groups with completely
different interests, they can result in "delay, disruption, and perceptions of
81. See Audrey G. McFarlane, When Inclusion Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted Terrain of
Community Participationin Economic Development, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 861, 874-92 (2000).
82. See generally Judith E. Innes, Planning Through Consensus Building: A New View of the
ComprehensivePlanningIdeal, 62 J. OF THE AM. PLANNING Ass'N. 460 (1996).

83. Id.at 464. This model is predicated on all participants having common information and all
becoming informed of each other's interests.

84. Id.at461,464-65.
85.

Peter W. Salsich, Jr., GrassrootsConsensus Building and CollaborativePlanning,3 WASH. U. J.L.

& POL'Y 709, 710 (2000).
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wasted time." 86 Such processes may be especially problematic in situations
of profound social conflict and disruption, and serve only to exacerbate
fissures along race, class, and gender lines. 87 Still, as advocates work to
refine the models, addressing issues of ethics, representation, mediation, and
implementation, they are a crucial tool for ensuring local government
accountability.
A second mechanism for holding governments and institutions
accountable is through coalition-building and grassroots advocacy. In this
regard, it might be instructive for fair housing advocates to take a page from
the property rights movement. The property rights movement suffered what
many viewed as a devastating setback in 2005, in the wake of the Supreme
Court's decision in Kelo v. City of New London. 88 After Kelo dramatically

expanded municipalities' eminent domain powers, property rights activists
teamed up with middle-class and working-class property owners and
successfully lobbied for eminent domain reform in at least 42 states. 89 They
also partnered with fair housing advocates to support plaintiffs like Mt. Holly
Gardens Citizens in Action in their lawsuit against the Township of Mt.
Holly.
While the property rights example is distinguishable in some significant
respects-namely the extremely well-financed nature of its "grass roots"
activism-it still resonates in many ways with the fair housing movement. 90
Professor Judith Koons described the struggle for fairness in "how a society
directs the use of land and treats the property belonging to its citizens" as one
of "locational justice." 9 1 She compared the post-Kelo activism with early
battles fought by communities of color, such as the one fought by black
citizens in Cocoa, Florida to resist a municipal redevelopment plan which
would have destroyed their neighborhood. In the Cocoa case, black residents
formed a committee called Save Our Neighborhood, which worked to
challenge the redevelopment plan on multiple political and legal fronts. It
compiled information about the relevant zoning, budgeting, and funding
issues and disseminated it to its members; developed a media and public
86. Audrey G. McFarlane, When Inclusion Leads to Exclusion: The UnchartedTerrain of Community
Participationin Economic Development, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 864 (2000).
87. Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participationin New Governance: Lessons From Chicago 's Public
Housing Reform Movement, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 117, 149-65 (2009).

88. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
89. Judith E. Koons, Locational Justice: Race, Class, and the Grassroots Protestof Property Takings,

46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 811, 836-37 (2006) ("[A] nascent coalition of middle class and working class
property owners has arisen in protest of the Kelo decision, showing the possibility of realignment of middle
class loyalties and, with that new alliance, the potentiality of more than momentary political change."). See
generally Anastasia C. Sheffler-Wood, Comment, Where Do We Go From Here? States Revise Eminent
Domain Legislation in Response to Kelo, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 617 (2006).
90. See Institute for Justice, 1.1 Thanks Its Cornerstone Supporters: Charles and David Koch,
http://www.ij.org/charles-a-david-koch-2 (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). The Institute for Justice-which

brought the Kelo case on behalf of the property owners, conducted state-wide lobbying efforts for eminent
domain reform-was created and is funded heavily by the billionaire Koch brothers. Id.
91. Koons,supra note 89 at 811.
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relations strategy to publicize the plight; filed a number of successful legal
challenges; and, finally, engaged in a get-out-the-vote campaign which
ultimately changed the composition of the Cocoa City Council.
According to Professor Koons, "the struggle for locational justice may
be advanced through racial and socioeconomic coalitions that seek political
and economic participation in democratic processes, not simply through
judicial or legislative protections of property rights." 9 2 Fair housing
organizations, advocates for the poor, community organizers, and others are,
and have been, engaging in this sort of multi-pronged, participatory approach
for decades. If disparate impact theory is eliminated in housing, such efforts
will be all the more significant.
V. CONCLUSION

Fair housing advocates are justifiably concerned right now, wondering
whether disparate impact theory will survive its third trip to the Supreme
Court, and if so, what form it may take. Perhaps the theory will both be
upheld and left unchanged. Even so, this moment should provide the
opportunity for some soul-searching about disparate impact, in light of its
theoretical limitations and lack of practical success. In particular, we would
do well to examine whether-and how-we can achieve the benefits of the
theory through alternate means. This Article endeavors to begin this
conversation.

92. Id. at 813.

